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I. INTRODUCTION
Human errors can have significant effects. Take, for example, game two of
the 2009 American League Division Series between the Minnesota Twins and
* MyLinda K. Sims is a J.D. candidate for 2011 at the Salmon P. Chase College of Law,
Northern Kentucky University. She earned her B.G.S. in General Studies from West Texas A&M
University in 2000 and her M.A. in Organizational Management from Dallas Baptist University in
2006. Special thanks to my family for their support through the writing process.
** Richard Bales is a Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Excellence in
Advocacy, Northern Kentucky University, Salmon P. Chase College of Law.
407
1
Bales and Sims: Much Ado About Nothing: The Future of Manifest Disregard After Ha
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVEW
the New York Yankees.I Umpire Phil Cuzzi called "a fly ball [hit] down the
left-field line" as foul. 2 However, the ball hit off the fielder's glove, landed fair,
and then "bounc[ed] into the stands for what should have been a ground-rule
double." 3 The press labeled Cuzzi's call "[a] truly awful call that might have
cost the Twins a victory on the road in their series with the Yankees."4
Decisions such as this have fueled a debate regarding instant replay in Major
League Baseball.
While individuals press for expanded review on the baseball diamond in the
6
major leagues, the arbitration community also wrestles with the issue of
expanded review. In particular the arbitration community struggles with whether
the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) contains exclusive standards of review or if
nonstatutory standards remain viable after the Supreme Court's 2008 decision in
Hall Street Associates v. Mattel, Inc.
Section 10 of the FAA contains a list of bases on which a court can vacate
8an arbitrational award. Lower courts have long stated but seldom have held that
these bases are nonexclusive. 9 Courts have found that they may vacate an award
on nonstatutory grounds in narrow circumstances, such as manifest disregard of
the law.10 In Hall Street, the Supreme Court created doubt as to whether
nonstatutory standards are still applicable when it stated that the grounds for
vacatur are "exclusive" to those stated in the FAA.11  Some courts have
interpreted this language to eliminate all nonstatutory grounds for vacatur. 12 In
contrast, other courts have interpreted it merely to limit the use of nonstatutory
grounds. 13 Thus, the circuit courts are split as to whether nonstatutory standards
of review such as manifest disregard of the law survive the Supreme Court's
decision in Hall Street.14
This Article argues that the FAA standards are not exclusive, and that while
the standard of manifest disregard of the law survives, it should be replaced with
1. Billy Witz, Umpiring Stumbles to the Fore, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 21, 2009, at Bl7.
2. Christine Brennan, Umpires' Postseason Errors Show MLB Needs Replay, USA TODAY,





7. 128 S. Ct. 1396 (2008). For a full discussion of the effect of Hall Street on the arbitration
community, see infra Parts III & IV.
8. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2006).
9. See Richard C. Reuben, Personal Autonomy and Vacatur After Hall Street, 113 PENN.
ST. L. REv. 1103, 1110 (2009). For a full discussion of nonstatutory bases used to vacate an
arbitrational award, see id. at 1110-16.
10. See, e.g., Coffee Beanery, Ltd., v. WW, L.L.C., 300 F. App'x 415, 419 (6th Cir. 2008)
("It is worth noting that since [1953], every federal appellate court has allowed for the vacatur of an
award based on an arbitrator's manifest disregard of the law.").
11. See Hall Street, 128 S. Ct. at 1404. For a full discussion of Hall Street, see infra Part III.
12. See infra Part IV.A.
13. See infra Part IV.B.
14. See infra Part IV.
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the standard of manifest disregard of the agreement. Under the doctrine of
manifest disregard of the agreement, a court may vacate an arbitration award
only if the award fails to "draw[] its essence" from the construction of the
contract. By contrast, under manifest disregard of the law, a court may base
vacatur on an arbitrator's acknowledgment and disregard of a legal principle.16
Part II.A will provide an overview of arbitration and of the standards of review
established through the FAA and the judicially-created nonstatutory grounds for
review. Part II.B will discuss the doctrine of manifest disregard of the law. Part
II.C will discuss the doctrine of manifest disregard of the agreement. Part III
will provide an overview of the United States Supreme Court decision in Hall
Street regarding the doctrine of manifest disregard of the law and recent
Supreme Court developments. Part IV will provide an overview of the circuit
court split resulting after Hall Street. Part V.A will discuss whether manifest
disregard of the law survives Hall Street and will present possible solutions to
resolve the circuit split. Part V.B will propose an exchange of manifest
disregard of the law for manifest disregard of the agreement.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Overview ofArbitration
Arbitration is a process, "governed by contract," in which the parties agree
to submit disputes to an impartial third party for decision.17  The resulting
decision is deemed to be final and binding.18 However, in the early years of
arbitration, courts were not willing to compel arbitration. 19  Courts'
unwillingness stemmed from two reasons: (1) their aversion to allowing
unskilled parties to "oust the court of jurisdiction," 20 and (2) their inability to
guarantee a process that was "fair and equitable." 2 1 To combat courts' refusal to
enforce arbitration agreements, Congress enacted the FAA in 1925. 22 The
Supreme Court has since acknowledged that the purpose of this legislation was
"to overrule the judiciary's longstanding refusal to enforce agreements to
arbitrate." 23
15. United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
16. See infra Part [V.A.
17. KATHERINE V.W. STONE & RICHARD A. BALES, ARBITRATION LAW 15 (2d ed. 2010).
18. See 9 U.S.C. § 9 (2006).
19. STONE & BALES, supra note 17, at 22.
20. Id. at 22 (internal quotation marks omitted).
21. Id. at 23 (citing Tobey v. Cnty. of Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313 (D. Mass. 1845) (No. 14,
065)).
22. Reuben, supra note 9, at 1107.
23. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-20 (1985); see also Jill Gross,
Hall Street Blues: The Uncertain Future of Manifest Disregard, 37 SEC. REG. L.J. 232, 232 (2009)
("The scope of permissible judicial review of arbitration awards poses the fundamental policy
2010] 409
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The FAA contains sixteen sections.24 Section 2 establishes that any
agreement to resolve disputes by arbitration arising out of transactions involving
maritime or commerce "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable" on the same
basis as other contractual provisions.25 This establishes that arbitration is
enforceable. It also establishes that arbitration is a creature of contract law and
26that arbitrational provisions should be viewed in this light. The other sections
of the FAA address procedural matters, such as (1) compelling arbitration
against an unwilling party,27 (2) appointing arbitrators, (3) calling and hearing
witnesses,29 and (4) issuing awards. Section 9 specifically permits an arbitrator
to issue an award that can be confirmed by court order.3 1
According to the FAA, a court "must" enforce an arbitration award "unless
[it] is vacated, modified, or corrected as prescribed in [s]ections 10 and 11."32
Sections 10 and 11 provide standards of review available to the judiciary for
vacatur, modification, or correction of an arbitrational award.33 The grounds for
judicial review provided under §§ 10 and 11 are extremely narrow and limited.34
While review is limited, it is still permitted, and it is vital to ensuring that
contractual agreements of parties are honored.35  Professor Michael LeRoy
outlines thirteen different ways in which a court may vacate an arbitration
award.36 These methods fall into two general categories-statutory and
nonstatutory.
3 7
question of whether and to what degree courts should intervene in the finality of the arbitration
process to ensure its integrity.").
24. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006).
25. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
26. Richard A. Bales, The Laissez-Faire Arbitration Market and the Need for a Uniform
Federal Standard Governing Employment and Consumer Arbitration, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 583, 584
(2004) (citing 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000)).
27. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2006).
28. Id. § 5.
29. Id. § 7.
30. Id. § 9.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. §§ 10-11.
34. STONE & BALES, supra note 17, at 22; see also Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc. v. Clemente, 272 F. App'x 174, 176 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Metromedia Energy, Inc. v.
Enserch Energy Servs., 409 F.3d 574, 578 (3d Cir.2005)).
35. See Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220 (1985); Gross, supra note 23,
at 233.
36. STONE & BALES, supra note 17, at 626-27 (quoting Michael H. LeRoy, Do Courts
Create Moral Hazard?: When Judges Nullify Employer Liability in Arbitrations, 93 MINN. L. REV.
998, 1032 n.209 (2009)).
37. See id.
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1. Statutory Standards ofReview
FAA § 10(a) outlines the only four statutory grounds for vacating an
arbitration award.38 First, it allows a court to vacate an award "where the award
was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means." 39 Courts have used a three-
part test to determine if they should vacate an arbitration award for fraud under
this section.40 They determine (1) if there is "clear and convincing evidence" of
fraud,41 (2) if due diligence would have resulted in the discovery of the fraud,42
and (3) if the fraud is materially related to the issue arbitrated.43
Second, the FAA allows a court to vacate an award "where there was
evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them." 44 To vacate
an award on this ground, the party seeking vacatur must establish either that the
arbitrator was biased for or against a particular party, or that extenuating
circumstances gave rise to lack of impartiality.45
Third, the FAA allows a court to vacate an award "where the arbitrators
were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient
cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the
controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have
been prejudiced." 46 This provision permits a party to challenge the issuance of
an arbitration award when the arbitrator denies a party's fundamental rights, such
as a fair hearing, right to counsel, or issuance of a discovery request. Courts
have used language such as "grossly and totally blocked" to demonstrate the
height of the standard that a party must reach to vacate an award based on
prejudice.48
The final statutory ground for vacatur is "where the arbitrators exceeded
their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite
award upon the subject matter submitted was not made." 49 Courts are currently
debating the definition and scope of this provision of the FAA, which this Article
38. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2006).
39. Id. § 10(a)(1).
40. See, e.g., Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 835 F.2d 1378, 1383 (11th Cir. 1988);
Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v. WW L.L.C., 501 F. Supp. 2d 955, 962 (E.D. Mich. 2007) (quoting Int'l Bd.
of Teamsters, Local 519 v. United Parcel Ser., 335 F.3d 497, 503 (6th Cir. 2003)).
41. Bonar, 835 F.2d at 1383 (citing LaFarge Conseils et Etudes, S.A. v. Kaiser Cement &
Gypsum Corp., 791 F.2d 1334, 1339 (9th Cir. 1986); Dogherra v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 679 F.2d
1293, 1297 (9th Cir. 1982)).
42. Id. (citing Karppinen v. Karl Kiefer Mach. Co., 187 F.2d 32, 35 (2d Cir. 1951)).
43. Id. (citing Kaiser Cement, 791 F.2d at 1339; Dogherra, 679 F.2d at 1297).
44. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2) (2006).
45. See Reuben, supra note 9, at 1108.
46. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3) (2006).
47. See Reuben, supra note 9, at 1109.
48. Cofinco, Inc. v. Bakrie & Bros., N.V., 395 F. Supp. 613, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); see also
Reuben, supra note 9, at 1109 (quoting Apex Fountain Sales, Inc. v. Kleinfeld, 818 F.2d 1089, 1094
(3d Cir. 1987); Cofinco, 395 F. Supp. at 615).
49. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (2006).
2010] 411
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will discuss in more detail in Part IV.50 The focus of these standards is on the
arbitration process and the arbitrator's impartiality rather than on the substantive
merits of an award.
2. Nonstatutory Standards ofReview
Courts have recognized standards for review that are not set forth in the text
of the FAA. 52 These judicially-created standards exist at common law, but their
viability is currently under debate.53 A few of the more notable standards
include: (1) vacatur based on "violation of public policy," 54 (2) vacatur based on
"arbitrary and capricious" award,55 and (3) vacatur based on an "irrational"
award.56 Although the majority of these standards are beyond the scope of this
Article, the standard of public policy warrants a brief explanation.
Although courts historically have had the power to review an arbitration
award if the award violated public policy, 57 they seldom use this power.
Courts have held that an award violated public policy if it required a party to
violate an established law. 59 Additionally, courts have focused on the award's
legality rather than its correctness,60 and have refused to uphold an award that is
illegal in application.61 The analysis to vacate an award based on public policy
is twofold: courts must first determine that a clear ublic policy exists and then
assess if the award in question violates the policy. This standard is high, and
courts rarely vacate an arbitrational award on grounds of public policy.63
50. See infra Part VI.
51. STONE& BALES, supra note 17, at 577-78.
52. Reuben, supra note 9, at 1110-16 (discussing several judicially-created standards and
cases in which their application is evident); see also LeRoy supra note 36, at 1032 n.209 (discussing
the various methods courts have used to vacate arbitration awards, including nonstatutory methods);
Darren K. Sharp & Laurence R. Tucker, Traversing Legal Labyrinths in Arbitration, 66 J. Mo. B.
24, 29 (2010) ("In addition to the statutory bases for vacating an arbitration award, many federal
courts developed other reasons for vacating an arbitration award under common law.").
53. See infra Part IV.
54. Reuben, supra note 9, at 1113.
55. Id. at 1114.
56. Id. at 1115.
57. See, e.g., United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 42 (1987) (citing
W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int'l Union of the United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic
Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983); Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 34-35 (1948)) ("A court's refusal
to enforce an arbitrator's award under a collective-bargaining agreement because it is contrary to
public policy is a specific application of the more general doctrine, rooted in the common law, that a
court may refuse to enforce contracts that violate law or public policy.").
58. Reuben, supra note 9, at 1114.
59. Misco, 484 U.S. at 43 (quoting W.R. Grace & Co., 461 U.S. at 766).
60. See Reuben, supra note 9, at 1114.
61. See Misco, 484 U.S. at 44 (quoting W.R. Grace & Co., 461 U.S. at 766).
62. Reuben, supra note 9, at 1114; see also Misco, 484 U.S. at 43.
63. Reuben, supra note 9, at 1114.
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6
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 2 [], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol62/iss2/5
MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING
B. Doctrine ofManifest Disregard of the Law
The doctrine of manifest disregard of the law is also a judicially-created
ground for courts to review and vacate an arbitration award.64  Courts have
generally defined the doctrine "as a refusal to apyly a clearly defined legal
principle known to the arbitrator to be controlling." The standard of manifest
disregard "means more than error or misunderstanding with respect to the law."66
An arbitration award must meet a three-step analysis for a court to vacate it
67under the doctrine of manifest disregard of the law. First, the court must
determine if a law exists that clearly governs the dispute between the parties.68
Second, the court must determine if the presiding arbitrator knew of the
controlling law and improperly applied it.69 Finally, the court must determine if
the arbitrator consciously disregarded or ignored the applicable law.7 0
The doctrine of manifest disre ard of the law first appeared in the Supreme
Court's opinion in Wilko v. Swan. The respondents, partners in a brokerage
firm, moved to stay court proceedings and compel arbitration, and the district
72court denied the motion. The Second Circuit reversed and ordered the parties
to arbitration.73 The Second Circuit concluded that the Securities Act of 1933
bound the arbitrator to decide the case in accordance with its provisions, and that
failure to do so would be a viable ground for vacating an arbitration award.74
64. Id. at ll10.
65. Jeffery W. Sarles, US Courts Wrestle with "Manfest Disregard" After Hall Street,
MAYER BROWN (Aug. 10, 2009), http://www.mayerbrown.com/internationalarbitration/article.
asp?id=7380&nid=235; see also Westerbeke Corp. v. Daihatsu Motor Co., 304 F.3d 200, 217 (2d
Cir. 2002) ("A party seeking vacatur must therefore demonstrate that the arbitrator knew of the
relevant principle, appreciated that this principle controlled the outcome of the disputed issue, and
nonetheless willfully flouted the governing law by refusing to apply it.").
66. COMM. ON ADR IN LABOR & EMP'T LAW, AM. BAR ASs'N, How ARBITRATION WORKS
34 (Alan Miles Ruben et al. eds., 6th ed. 2003) [hereinafter HOW ARBITRATION WORKS] (quoting
Carte Blanche (Singapore) PTE., Ltd. v. Carte Blanche Int'l, Ltd., 888 F.2d 260, 265 (2d Cir.
1989)).
67. Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 548 F.3d. 85, 93 (2d Cir. 2008).
68. Id. at 93 (quoting Duferco Int'l Steel Trading v. T. Klaveness Shipping, 333 F.3d 383,
389-90 (2d Cir. 2003)); see also Westerbeke Corp., 304 F.3d at 211.
69. Stolt-Nielsen, 548 F.3d at 93 (quoting Duferco, 333 F.3d at 390); see also Westerbeke
Corp., 304 F.3d at 217.
70. HOw ARBITRATION WORKS, supra note 66, at 77 (quoting M & C Corp. v. Erwin Behr &
Co., 87 F.3d 844, 851 n.3 (6th Cir. 1996)); see also Stolt-Nielsen, 548 F.3d at 93 ("[O]nce the first
two inquiries are satisfied, we look to a subjective element, that is, the knowledge actually
possessed by the arbitrators." (quoting Duferco, 333 F.3d at 390)); Westerbeke Corp., 304 F.3d at
217 ("It is not enough that ... the arbitrator was aware of the governing legal principle; there must
also be a showing of intent.").
71. 346 U.S. 427, 435-38 (1953); see also Lucy Reed & Phillip Riblett, Expansion of
Defenses to Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards in U.S. Courts?, 13 Sw. J.L. & TRADE
AMERICAS 121, 123 (2006) (discussing the Wilko decision).
72. Wilko v. Swan, 107 F. Supp. 75, 76, 79 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
73. Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439, 445 (2d Cir. 1953).
74. Id. at 444-45.
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed,76 stating that "[w]hile it
may be true . . . that a failure of the arbitrators to decide in accordance with the
provisions of the Securities Act would 'constitute grounds for vacating the award
pursuant to section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act,' that failure would need to
be made clearly to appear."77 In dissent, Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justice
Minton, stated, "Arbitrators may not disregard the law.... On this we are all
agreed." Some lower courts latched on to the Wilko language and adopted the
doctrine of manifest disregard of law as a nonstatutory standard for review and
vacatur, but other courts were reluctant.79
Widespread adoption of the doctrine did not occur until after the Court's
decision in First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan.80  The dispute in First
Options involved an agreement for debt repayment between a clearinghouse and
an investment company.81  The clearinghouse, First Options, compelled
arbitration against the investment company and its owners, Manuel and Carol
Kaplan, and the arbitrators ruled in favor of First Options.82  The Kaplans
contested the arbitration award in federal district court because they had never
personally signed the document containing the arbitration clause.83 The district
court confirmed the award,84 but the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and
ruled that the claim was not arbitrable.85 The Supreme Court granted certiorari86
and affirmed the Third Circuit's ruling. The Supreme Court stated that "only
in very unusual circumstances" will a court set aside an arbitrator's award. 8 The
Court listed the narrow grounds upon which a court could vacate an award as (1)
75. Wilko v. Swan, 345 U.S. 969 (1953).
76. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438.
77. Id. at 436 (footnote omitted) (quoting Wilko, 201 F.2d at 445).
78. Id. at 440 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
79. Compare Patten v. Signator Ins. Agency, 441 F.3d 230, 231 (4th Cir. 2006) ("[T]he
arbitrator's ruling constituted a manifest disregard of the law and was not drawn from the essence of
the governing arbitration agreement. As a result, we vacate the district court's refusal to vacate the
arbitration award . . . ."), with Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 354 (5th Cir.
2009) ("Indeed, manifest disregard of the law does not have a compelling origin as a ground for
vacatur."). For a discussion of the divide among lower courts after Wilko, see Kevin Patrick
Murphy, Note, Alive but Not Well: Manifest Disregard After Hall Street, 44 GA. L. REv. 285, 296-
98 (2009).
80. 514 U.S. 938 (1995); see also Reuben, supra note 9, at 1110 ("Wilko was overruled on
other grounds, but this particular dictum lives on, in part because it was cited approvingly in a 1995
Supreme Court case, First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan." (footnote omitted)); Murphy, supra note
79, at 297 ("By listing manifest disregard separately from the section 10 grounds, the Court [in First
Options] gave scholars and lower courts reason to believe that it approved of the meaning some
circuits had already given to the Wilko dicta.").
81. First Options, 514 U.S. at 940.
82. Id. at 940-41.
83. Id. at 941.
84. Id.
85. Id. (citing Kaplan v. First Options of Chi., Inc., 19 F.3d 1503, 1523 (1994)).
86. First Options of Chi., Inc., v. Kaplan, 513 U.S. 1040 (1994).
87. First Options, 514 U.S. at 941.
88. Id. at 942.
414 [VOL. 62: 407
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manifest disregard of the law and (2) § 10 of the FAA. 89  Thus, manifest
disregard of the law became widely recognized as a standard for review of an
arbitration award until the Supreme Court's decision in Hall Street.9 0
C. Manifest Disregard of the Agreement
Manifest disregard of the agreement, a doctrine found in labor law, allows a
court to vacate an award for failure to "draw[] its essence from the collective
bargaining agreement." 91 This standard applies when an arbitrator "deliberately
or recklessly disregard[s] indisputably controlling contract terms [and] issue[s]
an award that is not even arguably derived from the contract." 92
The phrase "draws its essence" originated in the Supreme Court's decision
in United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.93  Respondent
Enterprise Wheel terminated a number of workers when they chose not to return
to work in protest of the discharge of another employee. 9 4  The employees
sought specific enforcement of a collective bargaining agreement's arbitration
provisions in district court, and the court ordered arbitration.95 The arbitrator
found that the employees were improperly terminated and "awarded
reinstatement with back pay."96 When the district court enforced the arbitrator's
award, the company appealed.97  The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed
with the lower court that it had jurisdiction to enforce the arbitration award;98
however, it held that the arbitrator's finding of improper termination and award
of back pay were unenforceable. 99 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
determine whether the arbitrator had exceeded his authority by awarding back
pay and reinstatement. 100
89. Id. (citing 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1995); Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953)).
90. Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396 (2008).
91. United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960); see also
How ARBITRATION WORKS, supra note 66, at 112 ("Beginning with its Enterprise Wheel decision,
the Supreme Court limited the arbitrator's role in rights disputes to interpretation and application of
the collective bargaining agreement." (footnote omitted) (citing Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at
597)); Philip J. Loree, Jr., Hall Street Meets Pearl Street: Stolt-Nielson and the Federal Arbitration
Act's New Section 10(a)(4), LOREE REINSURANCE & ARB. L.F. para. 9 (May 29, 2009),
http://loreelawfirm.com/blog/hall-street-meets-pearl-street-stolt-nielsen-and-the-federal-arbitration-
act's-new-section-10a4 (discussing "manifest disregard of the agreement" as a ground for vacatur
where the arbitration award did not meet the essence standard).
92. Loree, supra note 91, para. 3.
93. 363 U.S. at 597.
94. Id. at 595.
95. Id. at 594-95.
96. Id. at 595.
97. Id. (citing United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 168 F. Supp. 308, 313
(S.D.W.V. 1958)).
98. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 269 F.2d 327, 332 (4th Cir. 1959).
99. See id.
100. See Enter. Wheel, 363 U.S. at 596.
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The Court refused to review the merits of the arbitration award. 101 Such
review would only serve to undermine the finality of arbitration. 102 The Court
held that the parties had "bargained for" the "arbitrator's construction" of the
agreement;103 therefore, as long as the award "concem[ed] construction of the
contract, the courts [had] no business overruling [the arbitrator] because their
interpretation of the contract [was] different from his."104 Additionally, the
Court held that an agreement between two parties binds the arbitrator to the
interpretation and application of that agreement, and that an arbitrator is not
empowered by the parties "to dispense his own brand of industrial justice." 05
While the arbitrator brings to the process an understanding and "knowledge of
the custom and practices ... of a particular industry," 106 an "award is legitimate
only so long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement." 0 7
Furthermore, "[w]hen the arbitrator's words manifest an infidelity to this
obligation, courts have no choice but to refuse enforcement of the award.""os
Thus, the Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit and found the arbitrator's
award enforcable. 109
Judicial review of labor arbitration cases is premised on § 301 of the Labor-
Management Relations Act (LMRA). 110 While the LMRA is empty on its face
regarding arbitration, the Supreme Court has fashioned § 301 into a general
statute overning arbitration claims arising under collective bargaining
disputes. As such, although a difference source of authority than the FAA, it
provides a comparison for arbitration under the FAA.1 12
Since Enterprise Wheel, other courts have also used the "draws its essence"
test when determining whether to enforce or vacate an arbitration award under
the doctrine of manifest disregard of the agreement.113 In particular, the Third
101. Id.
102. Id. at 596, 598-99 ("The federal policy of settling labor disputes by arbitration would be
undermined if courts had the final say on the merits of the awards.").
103. Id. at 599.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 597.
106. Id. at 596.
107. Id. at 597.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 598-99.
110. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2006) (allowing suits concerning violations of labor agreement
contracts to be brought in United States district courts).
111. See Bales, supra note 26, at 590 (citing Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S.
448, 455-57 (1957); Roberto L. Corrada, The Arbitral Imperative in Labor and Employment Law,
47 CATH. U. L. REv. 919, 922-23 (1998); Dennis R. Nolan & Roger I. Abrams, American Labor
Arbitration: The Maturing Years, 35 U. FLA. L. REv. 557, 583 (1983)).
112. See Edwin S. Hopson & Mitzi D. Wyrick, The Impact (Influence) of the Federal
Arbitration Act on Litigation over Arbitration, 13 LAB. LAW. 359, 361 (1997) ("[C]ourts have
interchangeably relied upon the FAA and § 301 of the LMRA.").
113. See e.g., Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Phoenix Mailers Union Local 752, 989 F.2d 1077,
1082 (9th Cir. 1993) ("A remedy, however, must still draw its essence from, and is therefore limited
by, the collective bargaining agreement."); Desert Palace, Inc. v. Local Joint Exec. Bd. of Las
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Circuit has been instrumental in establishing the parameters of the doctrine of
manifest disregard of the agreement. In United States Steel & Carnegie Pension
Fund v. McSkimming,114 the Third Circuit discussed the doctrine and stated, "If
an arbitral decision is based 'solely upon the arbitrator's view of the
requirements of enacted legislation,' rather than on the [contract], the arbitrator
has 'exceeded the scope of the submission,' and the award will not be
enforced."' 15 The court determined that a party could successfully challenge an
award only if it was "totally unsupported" by the parties' contract.116 In another
case, Dauphin Precision Tool v. United Steelworkers,117 the Third Circuit said,
"When parties to a [collective bargaining agreement] elect to have their disputes
settled through arbitration, our review of a resulting arbitration decision is
extraordinarily limited. . . . We do not review the merits of the decision or
correct factual or legal errors."118  Thus, it held that a court may vacate an
arbitrator's award only if it fails to reflect the agreement between the parties.119
The doctrine of manifest disregard of the agreement recognizes that an
arbitration award is not reviewable based on "errors of law." 120 The agreement
is only reviewable based on the bargained-for terms of the agreement. 121 The
arbitrator has authority to review only issues that fall within the scope of the
terms negotiated by the parties. 12 2 Going beyond this scope results in arbitrators
"exceed[ing] their power" 123 and provides a court with grounds to vacate the
award under the provisions of § 301 of the LRMA.124
Vegas, 679 F.2d 789, 791 (9th Cir. 1982) ("The scope of review of an arbitration award is limited to
whether the award 'draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement' . (quoting
United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960))).
114. 759 F.2d 269 (3d Cir. 1985).
115. McSkimming, 759 F.2d at 271 (alteration in original) (quoting Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 53 (1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted). See generally Pedro J.
Martinez-Fraga, The Future of 28 U.S. C. § 1782: The Continued Advance of American-Style
Discovery in International Commercial Arbitration, 64 U. MIAMI L. REv. 89, 120-22 (2009)
(discussing the Third Circuit's decision in McSkimming).
116. McSkimming, 759 F.2d at 270-71 (quoting Ludwig Honold Mfg. Co. v. Fletcher, 405
F.2d 1123, 1128 (3d Cir. 1969)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
117. 338 F. App'x 219 (3d Cir. 2009).
118. Id. at 222 (citing Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 509
(2001); Major League Umpires Ass'n v. Am. League of Prof'1 Baseball Clubs, 357 F.3d 272, 279
(3d Cir. 2004)).
119. See id. (quoting Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen's Union, 73 F.3d 1287, 1291 (3d
Cir. 1996)).
120. United Indus. Workers v. Gov't of V.I., 987 F.2d 162, 170 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing United
Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960)).
121. See Major League Umpires Ass'n, 357 F.3d at 279 (quoting Matteson v. Ryder Sys., Inc.,
99 F.3d 108, 113 (3d Cir. 1996)).
122. See id. (quoting Matteson, 99 F.3d at 113).
123. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (2006).
124. See Major League Umpires Ass'n, 357 F.3d at 279-80.
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III. HALL STREET
A. The Decision
The Supreme Court's decision in Hall Street Associates v. Mattel, Inc.125 has
resulted in a circuit split among lower courts.126 Because the Supreme Court
addressed the doctrine of manifest disregard only in dicta and without clear
direction on its future application,127 lower courts have interpreted the decision
differently.
In Hall Street, the Supreme Court held that §§ 10 and 11 of the FAA provide
the exclusive grounds for vacatur.128 The dispute in Hall Street resulted from a
landlord-tenant relationship. 129  Mattel, the tenant, signed a multiyear lease
agreement with Hall Street, the landlord, for manufacturing space;130 as part of
the lease, Mattel agreed that Hall Street would not be liable for any
environmental violations or cleanup costs.131 In 1998, an environmental
inspection found chemical levels in the water that violated Department of
Environmental Quality (DEQ) standards.132 After these findings, Mattel
terminated use of the polluted water well, "signed a consent order with the DEQ
providing for cleanup of the site," and notified Hall Street that it was ending the
lease agreement. 133
Hall Street sued in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon
to contest Mattel's termination of the lease agreement and to ensure that the lease
protected Hall Street from the environmental cleanup cost.134 The district court
ruled in favor of Mattel regarding termination of the lease, but the parties
proceeded to mediation over the indemnification issue.135 The mediation failed,
and as a result, the parties proposed arbitration.136 The parties' agreement to
arbitrate included a clause allowing the district court to "vacate, modify or
correct any award: (i) where the arbitrator's findings of facts [were] not
supported by substantial evidence, or (ii) where the arbitrator's conclusions of
law [were] erroneous."137 The arbitrator found in favor of Mattel, and Hall
Street filed a motion to vacate the award, which the court granted. 138 The district
court reviewed the award based on the standard that the parties had agreed upon,
125. 128 S. Ct. 1396 (2008).
126. See infra Part IV.
127. See Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1404.
128. Id. at 1403.








137. Id. at 1400-01.
138. Id. at 1401.
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and vacated and remanded it for further consideration.139 After another round of
arbitration, orders by both parties to vacate the award, and the district court's
decision to affirm the award, both parties appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals. 140
On appeal, Mattel argued that the contractual provision permitting judicial
review of legal error was unenforceable.141 The Ninth Circuit ruled for Mattel
and found that the clause was unenforceable.142 In its instructions to the district
court on remand, the Ninth Circuit implied that the FAA provides the only
mechanisms for vacatur.143 On remand, the district court again refused to uphold
the original findings of the arbitrator, Mattel appealed, and the court of appeals
reversed.144 Finally, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether
the FAA provided exclusive grounds for vacatur and modification.145
The question before the Court was "whether statutory grounds for prompt
vacatur and modification may be supplemented by contract."1 46 At the time of
the decision, the issue had divided lower courts.147
The Court, however, strayed from its analysis of the core issue and, in
responding to an argument presented by Hall Street, addressed the doctrine of
manifest disregard. Hall Street suggested that the language in Wilko v.
Swan149 demonstrated that the grounds for vacatur were not exclusive.150  The
Supreme Court responded by explaining that neither the issue nor the holding in
Wilko directly addressed expanded review; thus, the case was inapplicable to
deciding the issue in Hall Street.15 1  Rather than stopping the analysis at this
139. Id.
140. See id.
141. Id. Specifically, Mattel argued that the Ninth Circuit's decision in Kyocera Corp. v.
Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 1000 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc), overruled the
court's previous decision in LaPine Technology Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 888-90 (9th
Cir. 1997), which had interpreted the FAA as permitting parties the freedom to contract, even in the
area ofjudicial review. See Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1401.
142. Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1401 (quoting Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 113 F. App'x 272,
272-73 (9th Cir. 2004)).
143. Id. (quoting Hall St. Assocs., 113 F. App'x at 273).
144. Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1401 n.1 (citing Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc. 196 F. App'x 476,
477-78 (9th Cir. 2006)).
145. Id. at 1401 (citing Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 550 U.S. 968 (2007)).
146. Id. at 1400.
147. Id. at 1403 n.5 (outlining the circuit split regarding contractual expansion of judicial
review); see also Hiro N. Aragaki, The Mess of Manifest Disregard, 119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 1, 3
(2009), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/817.pdf ("At the time [of Hall Street], there had
been an unresolved circuit split regarding whether private parties were in fact entitled to alter the
vacatur and modification grounds set forth in FAA sections 10 and 11, respectively.").
148. See Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1404.
149. 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953).
150. Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1403.
151. Id. at 1403-04.
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point, however, the Court went further into the decision of Wilko and the
possible interpretations of the doctrine of manifest disregard. 152
The Court offered three ways in which courts could view the doctrine of
manifest disregard. 153 First, "[m]aybe the term 'manifest disregard' was meant
to name a new ground for review. ... Second, "maybe it merely referred to
the § 10 grounds collectively, rather adding to them."155  Finally, "'manifest
disregard' may have been shorthand for § 10(a)(3) or § 10(a)(4) . . . .
Unfortunately, the Court did not adopt any of these views or reject the use of
manifest disregard. 157 Instead, the Court left the doctrine just as it "found it."158
Additionally, the Supreme Court cited to its decision in First Options rather
than to its decision in Wilko. 159 The First Options Court had specifically listed
the doctrine of manifest disregard separately from standards provided in the
FAA statute,160 and the Hall Street Court stated:
Hall Street overlooks the fact that the statement [from Wilko that] it
relies on expressly rejects just what Hall Street asks for here, general
review for an arbitrator's legal errors. . . . We, when speaking as a
Court, have merely taken the Wilko language as we found it, . . . and
now that its meaning is implicated, we see no reason to accord it the
significance that Hall Street urges.161
The Hall Street Court was not concerned with judicially-created standards,
but rather with private parties expanding the standards.162 Hall Street argued that
"if judges can add grounds to vacate (or modify), so can contracting parties[,]"1 63
but according to the Court, this argument was quite a leap and "too much for
Wilko to bear."1 64  Thus, in the Court's opinion, allowing private parties to
expand judicial review would in effect make arbitration "merely a prelude to a








159. Id. (citing First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995)).
160. See supra notes 80-90 and accompanying text.
161. Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1404 (citing First Options, 514 U.S. at 942).
162. See id. at 1403-04. In his article, Professor Aragaki argues, "The High Court's holding
[in Hall Street] that the FAA's vacatur standards are 'exclusive' should be interpreted to mean only
that such standards cannot be expanded by private contract." Aragaki, supra note 147, at 5.
163. Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1403.
164. Id. at 1404.
165. Id. at 1405 (quoting Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987,
998 (9th Cir. 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Although the Court stated that the grounds for vacatur were exclusive,166 it
suggested three examples beyond § 10 of the FAA that could give parties access
to the courts: (1) a court's authority to manage its case load under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 16,167 (2) a state statute, or (3) the common law. 168
Ultimately, however, the Court left these ideas hanging in dicta.169
The explicit holding of Hall Street was confined to the limited issue of
whether private parties could contractually expand the judicial review of
arbitration beyond the statutory grounds provided for by the FAA.170 In Coffee
Beanery, Ltd. v. WW L.L. C., the Sixth Circuit described Hall Street as
pertaining only to private parties.172 Commentator Hiro N. Aragaki agrees with
this assessment of the Hall Street decision and contends that
[t]he clearest support for this argument is the Court's discussion of the
circuit split that formed the basis of Hall Street's petition for certiorari.
The Court described this split as a disagreement over whether FAA
sections 10 and 11 "are exclusive . . . [or] mere threshold provisions
open to expansion by agreement [of the parties]." . . .
Significantly, these courts were not split on the question of whether
the FAA precluded judge-made vacatur doctrines. Except the Seventh
and Ninth Circuits, all of these circuits had recognized manifest
disregard as a bona fide, common law vacatur standard. They were
split-and understood themselves to be split-solely on the question of
whether federal courts can be bound by private agreements to alter the
FAA's standards for vacatur and modification. The Court's use of the
term "exclusive" on the heels of this discussion must be understood in
this light.173
166. Id. at 1403.
167. See id. at 1407.
168. Id. at 1406.
169. See id. ("In holding that §§ 10 and 11 provide exclusive regimes for the review provided
by the statute, we do not purport to say that they exclude more searching review based on authority
outside the statute as well.... [H]ere we speak only to the scope of the expeditious judicial review
under § § 9, 10, and 11, deciding nothing about other possible avenues for judicial enforcement of
arbitration awards.").
170. Id. at 1400. But cf Aragaki, supra note 147, at 5 ("[A]1most all courts and commentators
make one common assumption: Hall Street's holding that the FAA grounds are 'exclusive' means
that henceforth, courts may refer only to those grounds when vacating arbitral awards in cases
governed by the FAA.").
171. 300 F. App'x 415 (6th Cir. 2008).
172. Id. at 418-19 ("The Court [in Hall Street] held that the FAA does not allow private
parties to supplement by contract the FAA's statutory grounds for vacatur of an arbitration
award.").
173. Aragaki, supra note 147, at 5-6 (alterations in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Hall
Street, 128 S. Ct. at 1403).
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The Supreme Court in Hall Street expressly stated, "We now hold that § § 10
and 11 respectively provide the FAA's exclusive grounds for expedited vacatur
and modification."" 4  While the Court's holding "significantly reduced the
ability of federal courts to vacate arbitration awards for reasons other than those
specified in § 10,",175 the holding applied the FAA as it relates to agreements
176
among private parties.
B. Developments Post-Hall Street.
Three significant events have occurred post-Hall Street that warrant a brief
discussion. First, the dynamics of the Supreme Court have changed with the
addition of Justice Sonia Sotomayor in August of 2009.177 Justice Sotomayor's
presence on the Court could sway its opinion in arbitration cases concerning
applicable standards of review.178 In the Second Circuit, Sotomayor drafted at
least eight opinions relating to arbitration. 17 9 In Westerbeke Corp. v. Daihatsu
Motor Co., writing for the court, Justice Sotomayor analyzed the possibility of
vacating an arbitrational award on the basis of manifest disregard of contract.18 1
In dicta, the court stated that courts could use manifest disregard to vacate an
award that offended the express terms of a contract or severely departed from a
contract in such a way that there was not even a "colorable justification" for the
arbitrator's award. 182 This decision validated the standard of manifest disregard
of the law and considered the viability of a different standard of review, manifest
disregard of the agreement. 183  In the Second Circuit, Sotomoyor's opinions
consistently demonstrated "respect for the finality of arbitration awards."184
Therefore, she is likely to "continue to enforce the strong federal policy favoring
arbitration"185 by vacating arbitrational awards only in rare and extreme cases,
such as manifest disregard of the agreement.
174. Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1403.
175. Coffee Beanery, Ltd., 300 F. App'x at 418.
176. Id. at 418-19; see also Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1403; Aragaki, supra note 147, at 5.
177. See Charlie Savage, Sotomayor Sworn in as Supreme Court Justice, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 8,
2009, at A12.
178. Cf Loree, supra note 91, at para. 10 (discussing an opinion written by Justice Sotomayor
which did not decide "an open question in the Second Circuit whether 'manifest disregard of the
agreement' was a ground for vacating an arbitral award" (citing Westerbeke Corp. v. Daihatsu
Motor Co., 304 F.3d 200, 221-22 (2d Cir. 2002))). But see Jill Gross, Judge Sotomayor and
Arbitration Law, ADR PROF BLOG para. 5 (May 28, 2009), http://www.indisputably.org/?p=287
("[Sotomayor's] confirmation is not likely to alter the current landscape of arbitration law.").
179. Gross, supra note 23 at para. 1.
180. 304 F.3d 200 (2d Cir. 2002).
181. Id. at 220-23. For another perspective on Justice Sotomayor's Westerbeke opinion, see
Loree, supra note 91, at paras. 10-13.
182. Westerbeke, 304 F.3d at 222.
183. See Loree, supra note 91, at para. 10-14.
184. Gross, supra note 23, at para. 4.
185. Id. at para. 5.
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Second, in October 2009, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in three
manifest disregard of the law cases 186: Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v. WW, L.L. C. 187 and
Grain v. Trinity Health,'" both from the Sixth Circuit, and Improv West
Associates v. Comedy Club, Inc.189 from the Ninth Circuit. In all three cases, the
party petitioning the Court for certiorari asked it to clarify the validity of the
doctrine of manifest disregard, 190 but the Supreme Court declined.
The final significant event since Hall Street occurred when the Supreme
Court issued its decision in Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds International
Corp.191 The issue before the Court was "whether imposing class arbitration on
parties whose arbitration clauses are 'silent' on that issue is consistent with the
Federal Arbitration Act." 192 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals had reversed
the district court, holding that "[b]ecause the parties specifically agreed that the
arbitration panel would decide whether the arbitration clauses permitted class
arbitration, the arbitration panel did not exceed its authority in deciding that
issue-irrespective of whether it decided the issue correctly." 193 The Second
Circuit discussed the effects of the Supreme Court's decision in Hall Street
regarding the doctrine of manifest disregardl94 and concluded that the doctrine
was still a valid ground for vacatur. 195 In support of its conclusion, the Second
Circuit cited to Justice Sotomayor's opinion in Westerbekel96 and to the Seventh
Circuit's decision in Wise v. Wachovia Securities, LLC. 197
In Stolt-Nielsen, the Supreme Court did not directly address whether the
doctrine of manifest disregard of the law continues to be a viable ground for
vacatur post-Hall Street.1 98 It did, however, discuss an arbitration panel's power
and authority under the FAA, 199 which in turn provides insights as to the
viability of the doctrine of manifest disregard of the law. The Court interpreted
vacatur under § 10(a)(4), "on the ground that the arbitrator 'exceeded [his]
powers,"'200 to exist "only when [an] arbitrator strays from interpretation and
186. Victoria VanBuren, 2009 Developments in Arbitration: Manfest Disregard of the Law,
DISPUTING (Dec. 24, 2009), http://www.karlbayer.com/blog/?p=6992.
187. 300 F. App'x 415 (6th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 81 (2009).
188. 551 F.3d 374 (6th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 96 (2009).
189. 553 F.3d 1277 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 145 (2009).
190. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *i, Comedy Club, Inc., No. 08-1525 (U.S. June 8, 2009),
2009 WL 1640367; Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *i, Trinity Health, No. 08-1446 (U.S. May 19,
2009), 2009 WL 1430034; Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *i, Coffee Beanery, Ltd., No. 08-1396
(U.S. May 11, 2009), 2009 WL 1354410.
191. 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).
192. Id. at 1764 (citing 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006)).
193. Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 101 (2d Cir. 2008).
194. Id. at 94-95 (citing Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1403-04 (2008)).
195. Id. at 95.
196. Id. (quoting Westerbeke Corp. v. Daihatsu Motor Co., 304 F.3d 200, 217 (2d Cir. 2002)).
197. Id. (quoting Wise v. Wachovia Sec., LLC, 450 F.3d 265, 269 (7th Cir. 2006)).
198. See Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1768 n.3.
199. See id. at 1767 (quoting Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504,
509 (2001)).
200. Id. (alteration in original).
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application of the agreement and effectively 'dispense[s] his own brand of
industrial justice' . .. 201 An arbitration agreement is entered into by consent of
the parties; therefore, the Court's analysis focused on whether the parties had
agreed to class arbitration.202 The inquiry under § 10(a)(4) is "whether the
arbitrators had the power, based on the parties' submissions or the arbitration
agreement, to reach a certain issue, not whether the arbitrators correctly decided
that issue." 203 If the arbitrator did not confine the decision to the contract, then
the arbitrator strayed from the contract, and thus exceeded his powers under
§10(a)(4) of the FAA.204  Because there was no agreement by the parties to
consent to class action arbitration, the contract was silent.2 05  Therefore, the
Court found that the arbitration panel had exceeded its power.206
IV. CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER MANIFEST DISREGARD OF THE LAW
The Court's unsettlin language from Hall Street has resulted in a split
among the circuit courts.20 The major divide exists between those that consider
the doctrine nullified and those that consider it still viable.208 Within those
circuits that consider the standard still viable, there is a split as to whether it
survives as a statutory or nonstatutory ground for review and vacatur.209 Part IV
will survey the current status of manifest disregard by outlining the split among
the circuit courts.
201. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Major League Baseball Ass'n, 532 U.S. at 509)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
202. See id. at 1776 ("Contrary to the dissent, but consistent with our precedents emphasizing
the consensual basis of arbitration, we see the question as being whether the parties agreed to
authorize class arbitration.").
203. Id. at 1780 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting DiRussa v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., 121
F.3d 818, 824 (2d Cir. 1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
204. See id. at 1776.
205. Id.
206. See id. at 1775 ("The panel's conclusion is fundamentally at war with the foundational
FAA principle that arbitration is a matter of consent.").
207. See, e.g., Aragaki, supra note 147, at 1 ("Just eighteen months after the U.S. Supreme
Court's March 25, 2008 decision in the controversial case of Hall Street Associates v. Mattel, Inc.,
three circuits are already in ripe disagreement as to whether Hall Street abrogates the half-century
old, judicially-created doctrine of 'manifest disregard."' (footnote omitted) (citing Hall St. Assocs.
v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396 (2008))); Gross, supra note 23, at 233 ("In the short time since Hall
Street, a new circuit split has emerged on the question of whether manifest disregard of the law
survives Hall Street as a valid ground to vacate an award under the FAA."); Griffin Toronjo
Pivateau, Reconsidering Arbitration: Evaluating the Future of the Manifest Disregard Doctrine, 21
S. L.J. (forthcoming 2011) ("Lower courts have been left to struggle with the aftermath [of Hall
Street]."); Christopher Walsh, Stolt-Nielsen's Comfort for the 'Average Arbitrator': An Analysis of
the Post-Hall Street 'Manifest Disregard' Award Review Standard, ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST
LITIG., Feb. 2009, at 19, 20 ("Despite Hall Street's apparent clarity, lower courts have disagreed
concerning the continued viability of the manifest disregard standard of review.").
208. See Reuben, supra note 9, at 1145-46; Walsh, supra note 207, at 19.
209. See infra Part IV.B.
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A. Manifest Disregard is Nullified
The First and Fifth Circuits have rejected the doctrine of manifest disregard
as a grounds for vacatur, holding that the grounds listed in the FAA are
exclusive.2 10
In Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. v. Bacon,211 the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that "manifest disregard of the law as an independent, nonstatutory
ground . . . must be abandoned and rejected."2 12 The case involved a dispute
between a bank, Citigroup, and an accountholder, Bacon, whose husband
213withdrew money from her account without her permission. Bacon, seeking
reimbursement from Citigroup for the total amount of the unauthorized
withdrawals, submitted her claim to arbitration, and the arbitration panel ruled in
her favor, granting damages and attorneys' fees of $256,000.214 Citigroup
moved to vacate the award, and the district court granted the motion. 2 15 The
district court held that "the award was made in manifest disregard of the law."216
In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Hall Street, the Fifth Circuit vacated
the district court's decision and remanded the case.217 On remand, the district
court could only consider the exclusive provisions of § 10 of the FAA. 218
In addition to the Fifth Circuit, the First Circuit in Ramos-Santiago v. United
Parcel Service,219 adopted the view that manifest disregard of the law was no
longer available.220 The court stated that Hall Street rendered the standard of
manifest disregard no longer a valid ground for review, even though it resolved
the case on other grounds.
B. Manifest Disregard Remains Viable
On the other hand, several circuits have concluded that manifest disregard of
the law remains a viable standard of review after Hall Street.222 These circuits
210. See Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 354 (5th Cir. 2009); Ramos-
Santiago v. United Parcel Serv., 524 F.3d 120, 124 n.3 (1st Cir. 2008) (citing Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at
1401-04); Aragaki, supra note 147, at 3-4 ("There are currently two broad schools of thought on
the issue. The first is that Hall Street spells the end of manifest disregard and, by implication, any
other non-statutory vacatur ground." (footnote omitted)).
211. 562 F.3d 349 (5th Cir. 2009).
212. Id at 358.




217. Id at 358.
218. Id
219. 524 F.3d 120 (1st Cir. 2008).
220. Id at 124 n.3.
221. Id.
222. Reuben, supra note 9, at 1145-46.
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are split, however, as to whether the standard of review is a statutory or
nonstatutory standard.
1. Nonstatutory View
The Sixth Circuit, in its unpublished opinion, Coffee Beanery, Ltd., v. WW
L.L. C.,223 has been alone in holding that manifest disregard still exists as a
nonstatutory standard of review for vacatur.224 The underlying dispute stemmed
from a failed franchise agreement.225 The shop owners petitioned the district
226court to vacate an arbitrational award, but the court denied the motion. On
appeal, the Sixth Circuit noted that Hall Street "significantly reduced," but "did
not foreclose," the issue of whether federal courts could review an arbitrational
award for manifest disregard of the law.227 The Sixth Circuit also interpreted
Hall Street's holding to be confined to attempts by "private parties" to expand
judicial review by contract.2 28  The court reasoned that Hall Street did not
directly abrogate manifest disregard, and because every circuit had previously
recognized the standard, there was no reason to depart from its use as a
nonstatutory ground for review.229 Thus, the court reversed the judgment of the
district court and vacated the arbitrator's award based on manifest disregard of
the law. 230
Since this initial decision, the Sixth Circuit has decided two additional cases
using a slightly different rationale. The first of these was Martin Marietta
Materials, Inc. v. Bank of Oklahoma,231 which involved a disputed lease
232
agreement. 23 The court stated that manifest disregard was questionable post-
Hall Street;233 it declined to address the issue, however, because the parties did
not dispute it.234 The second case was Grain v. Trinity Health,235 which involved
an arbitration between physicians and a former hospital employer.236 The
petitioners requested a modification of the arbitral award rather than vacatur;2 3 7
thus, the Sixth Circuit found that the doctrine of manifest disregard was not
223. 300 F. App'x 415 (6th Cir. 2008).
224. See id. at 419; Pivateau, supra note 207, at 2 (citing Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc. 128
S. Ct. 1396, 1404 (2008)).
225. Coffee Beanery, Ltd., 300 F. App'x at 416.
226. Id. at 417-18 (citing Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v. WW L.L.C., 501 F. Supp. 2d 955, 964 (E.D.
Mich. 2007)).
227. Id.
228. Id. at 418-19 (citing Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1400).
229. Id. at 419.
230. Id. at 420-21.
231. 304 F. App'x 360 (6th Cir. 2008).
232. Id. at 361.
233. Id. at 362 (quoting Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1404).
234. Id. at 362-63.
235. 551 F.3d 374 (6th Cir. 2008).
236. Id. at 376.
237. Id. at 377-78.
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applicable.238 However, the court acknowledged in dicta that manifest disregard
may "supplement . . . the enumerated forms of FAA relief."239 Consistent with
the Coffee Beanery decision, at least one district court in the Sixth Circuit has
continued to state that manifest disregard of the law remains a valid nonstatutory
ground for vacatur.240
2. Statutory View
Even prior to the decision in Hall Street, the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals adopted "a more expansive reading of § 10(a)(4)" 241 by holding that
manifest disregard "fits comfortably under the first clause of the fourth statutory
ground." 2 42 The Seventh Circuit is the only circuit that did not view manifest
disregard as a nonstatutory ground for review prior to Hall Street.243 Judge
Posner demonstrated a unique view of the court's role in reviewing arbitrational
awards, which he outlined best in Wise v. Wachovia Securities, LLC:
It is tempting to think that courts are engaged in judicial review of
arbitration awards under the Federal Arbitration Act, but they are not.
When parties agree to arbitrate their disputes they opt out of the court
system, and when one of them challenges the resulting arbitration award
he perforce does so not on the ground that the arbitrators made a mistake
but that they violated the agreement to arbitrate, ... conduct to which
the parties did not consent when they included an arbitration clause in
their contract . . . . [T]he issue for the court is not whether the contract
interpretation is incorrect or even wacky but whether the arbitrators had
failed to interpret the contract at all, for only then were they exceeding
the authority granted to them by the contract's arbitration clause.244
In Judge Posner's view, arbitrators' authority stems from the contract; thus,
arbitrators must confine their decisions to the scope of the contract.2 4 5  if
arbitrators stray from the contract, then they have exceeded their authority and
violated the agreement between the parties.
238. Id. at 380.
239. Id.
240. See Ozormoor v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 08-11717, 2010 WL 3272620, at *2 (E.D.
Mich. Aug. 19, 2010) (citing Jacada Ltd. v. Int'l Mktg. Strategies, Inc., 401 F.3d 701, 712 (6th Cir.
2005)).
241. See Loree, supra note 91, at para. 6 (quoting Wise v. Wachovia Sec., LLC, 450 F.3d 265,
269 (7th Cir. 2006)).
242. Wise, 450 F.3d at 268.
243. See Aragaki, supra note 147, at 4 n.25.
244. Wise, 450 F.3d at 269 (citations omitted) (citing Baravati v. Joshephthal, Lyon & Ross,
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The Second Circuit, in the case of Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds
International Corp.,247 adopted a view of manifest disregard of the law similar to
that of Judge Posner's. 248 The case involved a class action dispute regarding
violations of antitrust laws.249 Stolt-Nielsen moved to vacate an arbitration
award,250 and the court granted the motion, stating that the "award was made in
manifest disregard of the law."2 5 1 On appeal, the Second Circuit considered the
standard of manifest disregard of the law and viewed the doctrine "as a
mechanism to enforce the parties' afreements to arbitrate rather than as judicial
review of the arbitrators' decision." 52 The court stated that one could consider
253manifest disregard to be a 'judicial gloss" on § 10(a)(4). The court recognized
the power to vacate an award based on manifest disregard of the law under the
rare circumstance where an arbitrator is aware of clear controlling law,
understands the law to affect the outcome of the dispute, and then intentionally
chooses to ignore the law.254 This amounts to the arbitrators' "fail[ure] to
interpret the contract at all,"255 and, in effect, means they have 'exceeded their
powers . . . ."'256 Stolt perhaps not only preserved manifest disregard of the law,
but also gave life to manifest disregard of the agreement.257
Since the decision in Stolt, the Second Circuit has reviewed at least three
additional cases regarding manifest disregard of the law. The most recently
decided case, TCo. Metals, LLC v. Dempsey Pipe & Supply, Inc.,258 involved
arbitration in the context of a commercial dispute over sales contracts. 259 The
court concluded that although manifest disregard was still a valid ground on
which to vacate,260 it was inapplicable in that case. 2 6 1 Earlier in E.E. Cruz, NAB
247. 548 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2008), rev'd on other grounds, 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010); see supra
notes 191-206.
248. See id. at 94.
249. Id. at 87.
250. Id. at 90.
251. Id. (citing Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 435 F. Supp. 2d 382, 387
(S.D.N.Y. 2006)).
252. Id. at 95.
253. Id. at 94.
254. Id. at 95 (quoting Westerbeke Corp. v. Daihatsu Motor Co., 304 F.3d 200, 217 (2d Cir.
2002)).
255. Id. at 95 (quoting Wise v. Wachovia Sec., LLC, 450 F.3d 265, 269 (7th Cir. 2006))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
256. Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (2006)).
257. See Loree, supra note 91, at para. 14; supra notes 192-96 and accompanying text.
258. 592 F.3d 329 (2d Cir. 2010).
259. Id. at 334-37.
260. Id. at 340 (quoting Stolt-Nielsen, 548 F.3d at 94-95).
261. Id. ("Even if the Court were to address and confirm our interpretation of the manifest
disregard doctrine, . . . such a decision would provide no solace to T.Co. We agree with the district
court that '[e]ven if "manifest disregard of the law" [is] still a viable theory, it would be
inapplicable here . . . .' (quoting T.Co. Metals LLC v. Dempsey Pipe & Supply, Inc., No. 07-civ-
7747, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112087, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2008))).
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v. Coastal Caisson, Corp.,262 the court cited to Stolt as judicial precedent in the
263context of a dispute regarding a construction subcontract. The court expressly
stated, "In light of intervening precedent, it has become clear that the district
court erred in vacating the first award for 'manifest disregard' of New York
law."264 Another case where the Second Circuit Court of Appeals cited to Stolt
as precedent was Telenor Mobile Communications v. Storm LLC.265 There, the
court noted that "[f]ederal courts with jurisdiction to enforce an arbitral award
may also consider whether the award was in 'manifest disregard' of the law." 266
The Ninth Circuit has followed a similar approach to that of the Seventh and
Second Circuits. In Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv West Associates, 26 the court
found that manifest disregard of the law was "shorthand" for § 10(a)(4).268 The
case involved a dispute regarding a trademark license infringement and
agreement.269 The Ninth Circuit held that the award was in manifest disregard of
the law and that the arbitrator had exceeded the scope of his authority under
§ 1 0(a)(4).270 In addition, United States Life Insurance Co. v. Superior National
Insurance Co.271 perpetuated this view by finding that the doctrine of manifest
disregard fits under § 10(a)(4) of the FAA.
27 2
C. Other Responses to Manifest Disregard of the Law
Two circuits have sidestepped manifest disregard and two circuits have not
yet addressed the issue of whether manifest disregard remains a viable ground
for review after Hall Street. The Fourth and Tenth Circuits have acknowledged
the quagmire of manifest disregard and have chosen to decide cases presenting
the issue on different grounds, thus addressing manifest disregard only in dicta
or footnotes.273 The Eleventh and D.C. Circuits have yet to decide this issue.
In Raymond James Financial Services, Inc. v. Bishop,274 a recent opinion
from the Fourth Circuit, the court recognized the "uncertainty" surrounding the
Supreme Court's decision in Hall Street.275 However, the court found it
262. 346 F. App'x 717 (2d Cir. 2009).
263. Id. at 718-19.
264. Id. at 719 (citation omitted) (quoting Stolt-Nielsen, 548 F.3d at 95).
265. 584 F.3d 396 (2d Cir. 2009).
266. Id. at 407.
267. 553 F.3d 1277 (9th Cir. 2009).
268. Id. at 1290 (quoting Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987,
997 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc)).
269. Id. at 1280-81.
270. See id. at 1288.
271. 591 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 2010).
272. See id. at 1177 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (2006); Schoenduve Corp. v. Lucent Techs.,
Inc., 442 F.3d 727, 731 (9th Cir. 2006)).
273. See Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Bishop, 596 F.3d 183, 193 n.13 (4th Cir. 2010);
Hicks v. Cadle Co., 355 F. App'x 186, 197 (10th Cir. 2009).
274. 596 F.3d 183 (4th Cir. 2010).
275. Id. at 193 n.13.
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"unnecessary to consider the effect of Hall Street" because it could vacate the
276award under § 10(a)(4).
In three cases, litigants have presented the Tenth Circuit with the issue of
whether manifest disregard remains a viable source of review post-Hall Street.277
Each time the court has decided the case on grounds other than manifest
disregard of the law.278 Prior to Hall Street, the Tenth Circuit recognized
nonstatutory standards of review.279 However, in Hicks v. Cadle Co., 0 the
court stated that "the FAA 'compels a reading' that the statute sets forth
exclusive grounds for review." 2 8 1 This language indicates that the Tenth Circuit
will no longer reco nize manifest disregard as an independent, nonstatutory
standard of review.
The Eleventh and D.C. Circuits have yet to address or be presented with the
issue of manifest disregard post-Hall Street. Therefore, it is unclear which of the
various positions these two circuits will take.
V. ANALYSIS
Circuit courts are split as to whether manifest disregard of the law survives
the Supreme Court's decision in Hall Street.283 The doctrine of manifest
disregard of the law is thus not uniformly applied across arbitration cases, which
results in inequitable availability of standards of review. A party's ability to
appeal arbitrational awards depends on which circuit has jurisdiction and which
standard of review that circuit applies. This Article argues first, that manifest
disregard of the law survives Hall Street,284 and second, that even though the
doctrine survives, the standard is unworkable and should be replaced by the new
standard of manifest disregard of the agreement.285
276. Id.
277. See Legacy Trading Co. v. Hoffman, 363 F. App'x 633, 635-36 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Hollern v. Wachovia Sec., Inc. 458 F.3d 1169, 1176 (10th Cir. 2006)); Hicks, 355 F. App'x at 197;
DMA Int'l, Inc. v. Qwest Commc'ns Int'l, Inc., 585 F.3d 1341, 1344 n.2 (10th Cir. 2009).
278. See Hoffman, 363 F. App'x at 636; Hicks, 355 F. App'x at 197; Qwest, 585 F.3d at 1344
n.2.
279. See, e.g., Lewis v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 500 F.3d 1140, 1150 (10th Cir. 2007) ("[A]
court may grant a motion to vacate an arbitration award only in the limited circumstances provided
in § 10 of the FAA, or in accordance with a few judicially created exceptions." (quoting Bowen v.
Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 932 (10th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted));
Sheldon v. Vermonty, 269 F.3d 1202, 1206 (10th Cir. 2001) ("We have also recognized [in addition
to § 10 of the FAA] 'a handful of judicially created reasons' that a district may rely upon to vacate
an arbitration award, and these include violations of public policy, manifest disregard of the law,
and denial of a fundamentally fair hearing." (quoting Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. v. Union Pac.
R.R., 119 F.3d 847, 849 (10th Cir. 1997))).
280. 355 F. App'x 186 (10th Cir. 2009).
281. Id. at 196 (quoting Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1404 (2008)).
282. See id.
283. See supra Part IV.
284. See infra Part V.A.
285. See infra Part V.B.
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A. Manifest Disregard of the Law Survives Hall Street
The first proposition that this Article argues is that manifest disregard
survives Hall Street. There are five reasons to support this interpretation of the
Supreme Court's decision. First, the holding in Hall Street applies only to
private-party expansion of judicial review. Second, manifest disregard surfaces
in the Court's opinion only as a response to Hall Street's argument regarding
Wilko. Third, the Court did not expressly eliminate manifest disregard. Fourth,
the Court opened up additional avenues of review to parties seeking judicial
review. Finally, the Court's use of the term "exclusive" must be read in the
context of the its holding to avoid unintended consequences.
First, the holding in Hall Street applies only to private-party expansion of
286
judicial review. As originally suggested in Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v. WW
L.L. C.,287 and further developed by Hiro Aragaki,2 88 the Court in Hall Street was
concerned with expansion of judicial review by private parties. The issue
presented to the Court was whether the standards in the FAA for vacatur and
modification "may be supplemented by contract." 289  The concern was with
expansion through contract and not with expansion by the judiciary. The Court
in Hall Street stated that it was a "leap from a supposed judicial expansion by
interpretation to a private expansion by contract.'29
One of the original barriers to enforcement of arbitration awards was courts'
aversion to allowing unskilled parties to "oust the court." 291 The Hall Street
Court was protecting courts against ouster by parties' private contracts.
Allowing parties to control by contract what has been left to the courts by statute
would undermine the key goals of arbitration-finality and efficiency.292
Arbitration would become nothing more than a mere prelude to more complex
litigation rather than a process of forum selection in which parties can opt out of
litigation.293 The proper conclusion based on the holding in Hall Street is that
the Court was concerned with private-party expansion and not with the
established standard of review of arbitration awards.
286. See supra Part HI.A.
287. 300 F. App'x 415, 418-19 (6th Cir. 2008) ("The Court [in Hall Street] held that the FAA
does now allow private parties to supplement by contract the FAA's statutory grounds for vacatur
of an arbitration award." (citing Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1400)).
288. For example, Aragaki suggests that the Court limited Hall Street to private parties based
on the Court's discussion of the circuit split regarding manifest disregard. See Aragaki, supra note
147, at 5. Specifically, he references the fact that the Court emphasized that the split is based on
whether or not the circuit allows parties to contract for expanded judicial review of arbitration
awards. See id. at 6 (quoting Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1403 & n.5).
289. Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1400.
290. Id. at 1404.
291. See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
292. See Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1405 (quoting Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs.,
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Second, manifest disregard surfaced in the Court's opinion only as a
response to Hall Street's argument that the Wilko holding demonstrated that the
FAA grounds are not exclusive. 2 94 The Court responded by stating that Hall
Street's attempt to jump from nonstatutory judicially-created standards to an
expansion by contracting parties was "too much for Wilko to bear."295 When
responding to Hall Street's argument in defense of the doctrine of manifest
disregard of the law, the Court cited to First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan
296rather than Wilko. The Court in First Options listed the doctrine of manifest
disregard of the law separately from the statutory grounds enunciated in the
FAA. 97  The Court admonished the use of manifest disregard of the law as
justification for expansion of the statutory grounds by private parties, but did not
advocate elimination of the standard.2 98
Third, the Court did not expressly eliminate manifest disregard. While the
Court speculated on the proper interpretation of the doctrine of manifest
disregard of the law, it did not overrule or abolish its use.299 The Court decided
to leave the doctrine of manifest disregard "as [it] found it, without
embellishment ... ."300 Thus, the Court indicated that the doctrine of manifest
disregard of the law should be applied as it was prior to Hall Street.
Fourth, the Court in Hall Street noted additional avenues of review available
to parties.301 If the Court intended to limit standards of review only to the four
enumerated in the statute, then it should not have addressed the other means of
judicial review. The Court stated that its holding did not "exclude more
searching review based on authority outside the statute . . . ."302 The Court
suggested that lower courts could use the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a
method for review in cases such as Hall Street where the lower court had ordered
arbitration.303 The Court also suggested that the avenues of state statute or
common law were available.304 These are doors that the Court willingly opened
to parties seeking judicial review. The Court's suggestion thus confirms that
grounds for review beyond the FAA still remain viable.
Finally, the term "exclusive" should be read in context of the Court's
holding to avoid unintended consequences. In Hall Street, the Court held that
the grounds for vacatur are "exclusive" to § 10(a).30 The Court used the term
"exclusive" in the context of private-party contractual expansion of judicial
294. Id. at 1403.
295. Id. at 1404.
296. Id.
297. See supra notes 80-90 and accompanying text.
298. See Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1404.
299. See Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1404.
300. Id.
301. See id. at 1406.
302. Id. at 1403.
303. See id. at 1407.
304. See id. at 1406.
305. Id.
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review. The Court addressed the circuit split regarding whether the FAA
standards were exclusive or "open to expansion by agreement,"3 06 and
determined that the standards are exclusive and, as such, are not open to
expansion by contracting parties. In that context, the term "exclusive" is
appropriate and does not warrant the elimination of the standard of manifest
disregard of the law.
However, some have interpreted the "exclusive" language broadly and well
beyond the Court's usage by statin that the Court intended to eliminate all
nonstatutory grounds for review. If one gave the language the broad
interpretation, then "exclusive" would mean complete elimination of all
nonstatutory standards of review. This elimination would include such
nonstatutory grounds based on "arbitrary and capricious" and "irrationality." 308
This interpretation would ultimately work against the courts.
For example, the use of public policy as a means to vacate an award requires
a party to perform an illegal act. If the Court eliminated this ground, then
courts would face the dilemma of enforcing an illegal award.3 10 Richard Reuben
suggests that public policy might be the only nonstatutory ground to survive Hall
Street.311 This argument in itself defeats the view of broad interpretation of the
"exclusive" language. If one nonstatutory standard survives, then the Court's
decision by definition is not "exclusive." It is illogical to "cherry pick" the
grounds that should survive post-Hall Street. One should read the Court's
decision as "exclusive" in a particular context (the context of private parties
contracting for expanded review standards) rather than as a complete bar.
B. Exchange the "Law"for the "Agreement"
The second proposition this Article argues is that the Supreme Court should
resolve the circuit court split by eliminating the standard of manifest disregard of
the law and replacing it with the standard of manifest disregard of the agreement.
This section will discuss: (1) why courts should utilize manifest disregard of the
agreement, (2) how courts should apply the standard of manifest disregard of the
agreement, and (3) the policies that favor the establishment of a new standard.
306. Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1403.
307. See Aragaki, supra note 147, at 5; Reuben, supra note 9, at 1162.
308. Reuben, supra note 9, at 1162.
309. See supra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.
310. See Reuben, supra note 9, at 1142 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §
178 (1981); J. Calamari & J. Perillo, The Law of Contracts 781 (2d ed. 1977); E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 5.2 (1982)).
311. See id. at 1162.
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1. Definition
312Manifest disregard of the agreement stems from labor law. Failure by an
arbitrator to issue an award that "draws it[s] essence" from the contract 3 13 or "to
interpret the contract at all" is manifest disregard of the agreement.314 Manifest
disregard of the agreement fits comfortably within the statutory provisions of
§ 10 of the FAA. It fits under this doctrine because the arbitrator's power
centers around the contract, which is the bargained-for agreement between the
parties. When an arbitrator's award is beyond the contemplated agreement of the
parties, the arbitrator has exceeded the power given to him by the parties and the
award is unenforceable. Stolt-Nielsen stated that in these circumstances,
arbitrators had "'exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them"' by
"'fail[ing] to interpret the contract at all."' 315  Arbitration is a choice made
voluntarily by the parties where they opt out of the court system.3 16 Standards of
vacatur should reflect this agreement between the parties and the value of finality
central to arbitration. Manifest disregard of the agreement, unlike manifest
disregard of the law, honors the contract between the parties while complying
with the statutory construction of the FAA, thus upholding the value of finality.
Therefore, the Supreme Court should look to cases under the LMRA to resolve
the current circuit split and apply manifest disregard of the agreement to cases
under the FAA.
2. Application
Courts should apply the standard of manifest disregard of the agreement
using the following framework. One can break down manifest disregard of the
agreement into three elements: (1) an arbitrator's authority-which is derived
from and limited by the contract-creates a contractual duty to the parties; 317 (2)
an arbitrator breaches his or her contractual duty by "fail[ing] to interpret the
contract at all";318 and (3) an arbitrator's award that breaches this duty shall be
vacated under § 10(a)(4) of the FAA.319 These elements provide a step-by-step
312. See HOW ARBITATION WORKS, supra note 66, at 112 (quoting United Steelworkers v.
Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 396 U.S. 593, 597 (1960)). For a full discussion of manifest disregard
of the agreement, see supra Part I.C.
313. See id. (quoting Enter. Wheel, 396 U.S. at 597).
314. Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 95 (2nd Cir. 2008) (quoting
Wise v. Wachovia Sec., LLC, 450 F.3d 265, 269 (7th Cir. 2006)).
315. Stolt-Nielsen, 548 F.3d. at 95 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (2006); Wise, 450 F.3d at
269).
316. See STONE & BALES, supra note 17, at 15.
317. See How ARBITRATION WORKS, supra note 66, at 113 (quoting Barrentine v. Ark.-Best
Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 744 (1981)).
318. Stolt-Nielsen, 548 F.3d at 95 (quoting Wise, 450 F.3d at 269).
319. Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (2006)).
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analysis that courts should apply to determine if an award should be vacated
based on manifest disregard of the agreement.
In step one, the courts should consider the contract between the parties. The
contract establishes and limits the arbitrator's authority, which in turn creates a
contractual duty owed to the parties. The courts should evaluate the bargained-
for agreement between the parties following applicable standards of contract
interpretation. Because an arbitrator's authority stems from the arbitration
clause within the contract, his or her authority to resolve a dispute is directly
linked to the contract. This direct link establishes the contractual duty owed by
the arbitrator to the parties, and the contractual agreement of the parties binds the
arbitrator. When an arbitrator abandons the contractual agreement between the
parties, the arbitrator loses his or her basis of decisional power. 32 0 Therefore, the
courts should first consider the contract, which defines and limits the arbitrator's
authority and creates the contractual duty owed to the parties.
In step two, courts should determine if the arbitrator has breached the
contractual duty owed to the parties. To make this determination, courts should
compare the arbitration award against the interpretation of the contract and
decide if the arbitrator's award derives from or "draws its essence" from the
contract.32 1  When the parties enter into a contract, they have reasonable
expectations that stem from that contract.322 If the arbitrator fails to interpret the
contract, then the arbitrator moved beyond the scope of the contract, thus defying
the reasonable expectations of the parties. If the arbitrational award is beyond
the scope of the contract, then the arbitrator has breached his or her contractual
responsibility to the parties. An arbitrator's job is to "interpret the contract." 323
In step three, courts should consider the appropriate remedy. As long as
there is at least a "colorable justification" for the arbitrator's decision, "the award
must stand." 324  If, however, courts find that the arbitrator has breached the
contractual responsibility to the parties by failing to interpret the contract, then
courts should vacate the arbitrational award pursuant to the "exceeding power"
clause of § 10(a)(4) of the FAA. 32 5
The doctrine of manifest disregard of the agreement is a "mechanism" b
which courts can protect parties when arbitrators exceed their powers.
Arbitrators' authority is based in the contract, and when arbitrators ignore the
320. See Stolt-Nielsen, 548 F.3d at 95 (quoting Wise, 450 F.3d at 269).
321. For a full discussion of the "essence" test, see supra Part II.C.
322. Mo Zhang, Contractual Choice ofLaw in Contracts ofAdhesion and Party Autonomy, 41
AKRON L. REv. 123, 142 (2008) ("It has been well stated that the main underlying purpose of the
law of contracts is the realization of reasonable expectations that have been induced by the making
of a promise.").
323. See supra notes 119-24, 200-06 and accompanying text.
324. Westerbeke Corp. v. Daihatsu Motor Co., 304 F.3d 200, 222 (2d Cir. 2002).
325. See Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 548 F.3d. 85, 95 (2d Cir. 2008)
(quoting 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (2006); Wise v. Wachovia Sec., LLC, 450 F.3d 265, 269 (7th Cir.
2006)).
326. Stolt-Nielsen, 548 F.3d at 95.
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contract between the parties, they have exceeded their powers. Thus, when an
arbitrator manifestly disregards the agreement of the parties, courts should vacate
the award under § 10(a)(4) of the FAA.
3. Policy Support
There are three policy reasons to favor the establishment of the new standard
of manifest disregard of the agreement. First, arbitration is a creature of contract
law. Second, manifest disregard of the agreement supports the national policy
favoring arbitration. Third, this new standard reconciles the Supreme Court's
cases under the FAA with the Court's LIRA § 301 labor arbitration cases.
First, arbitration is a creature of contract law. The opinion of the Seventh
Circuit-written by Judge Posner-in Wise provides a framework for this
view.327 Judge Posner asserts that the judiciary does not review an arbitration
award for correctness, but rather for whether the parties upheld the agreement. 32 8
When parties choose arbitration, "they opt out of the court system" through an
arbitration clause,329 which is a contractual agreement between the parties.330
This a reement contains terms and conditions, which the parties have agreed
upon,3 and these terms and conditions will control the relationship between the
parties.332 When an arbitrator resolves a dispute by violating the express agreed-
upon terms of the parties, the arbitrator has manifestly disregarded the
agreement, and thus violated the basic underlying assumption of the parties. As
such, the parties will have been robbed of the benefit they reasonably expected to
receive when they entered into the contract. When acting outside the scope of
the contract, arbitrators have stepped beyond the authority given to them by the
contract.
If arbitrators were free to make decisions outside the scope of the contract,
then arbitration would become an unstable means of dispute resolution. Parties
would have little assurance that arbitrators would recognize sound legal
principles or controlling industry standards. Such a situation could be akin to
Russian roulette, with parties never knowing what the end result would be.
Second, manifest disregard of the agreement supports the national policy
favoring arbitration.333 Arbitration awards are to be final and binding, and thus




331. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 5 (1981).
332. See id. § 1.
333. For example, the Court in Hall Street stated the following: "Congress enacted the FAA to
replace judicial indisposition to arbitration with a 'national policy favoring [it] and plac[ing]
arbitration agreements on equal footing with all other contracts."' Hall St. Assocs.v. Mattel, Inc.,
128 S. Ct. 1396, 1402 (2008) (alterations in original) (quoting Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v.
Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006)); see also STONE & BALES, supra note 17, at 2 ("In addition to
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unreviewable except under the grounds articulated in § 10 of the FAA. 334
Manifest disregard of the law implies that a court can review an award for legal
error. However, the FAA sets forth four standards under which a court can
review an arbitrational award, none of which have to do with legal error.335 The
336initial three provisions are strictly procedural. The fourth provision addresses
an arbitrator's power but still does not authorize review based on the merits of
the award.337  In contrast, manifest disregard of the agreement fits within the
FAA provisions and supports the overall values of finality and efficiency.
Third, this new standard reconciles the Supreme Court's cases under the
FAA with the Court's LMRA § 301 labor arbitration cases. As discussed in Part
II.C of this Article, manifest disregard of the agreement is a doctrine firmly
rooted in § 301 labor law. It is a doctrine that the Supreme Court created when it
interpreted that statute as creating an arbitration regime for resolving labor
disputes. Recognizing the same doctrine under the FAA would reconcile judicial
interpretation of these two statutory schemes.
VI. CONCLUSION
The status of expanded judicial review has been the center of debate since
the Supreme Court's decision in Hall Street. The Court held that the standards
of review within § 10 of the FAA are "exclusive." As a result, circuit courts are
currently split as to whether the judicially-created standard of review of manifest
disregard of the law survives. Those circuits that continue to recognize manifest
disregard of the law are split as to whether it is a statutory or nonstatutory
standard of review.
This Article argues two propositions. First, it argues that the doctrine of
manifest disregard of the law survives the Supreme Court's decision in Hall
Street. Second, it argues that even though the standard of manifest disregard of
the law survives, it should be replaced with the standard of manifest disregard of
the agreement. The Supreme Court should resolve this split by eliminating the
former in favor of the latter. Manifest disregard of the agreement recognizes that
arbitration is a creature of contract law and affirms the national policy favoring
arbitration. This standard fits securely within the provisions of § 10. Manifest
disregard of the agreement is the appropriate standard by which to evaluate
whether arbitrators have exceeded their powers, and therefore, it should be the
standard in the future.
the growing use of arbitration by private parties, the state and federal courts have embraced
arbitration as a means of conserving judicial resources.").
334. See Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1403.
335. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2006).
336. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(l)-(3) (2006); STONE & BALES, supra note 17, at 577.
337. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (2006).
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